Skip to main content
Elsevier
View Cart
My account

Books in Game theory and bargaining theory

BooksJournals

    • Mechanism Design, Behavioral Science and Artificial Intelligence in International Relations

      • 1st Edition
      • July 22, 2024
      • Tshilidzi Marwala
      • English
      • Paperback
        9 7 8 0 4 4 3 2 3 9 8 2 3
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 4 4 3 2 3 9 8 3 0
      Recent advances in AI and Mechanism Design provide a vital tool for solving collective action problems, common in international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms for cooperation and coordination, we can better address issues such as climate change, trade, and security. Mechanism Design, Behavioral Science and Artificial Intelligence in International Relations shows readers how the intersection of Mechanism Design and Artificial Intelligence is revolutionizing the way we approach international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms, we can design better institutions, policies, and agreements that are more effective and efficient. Dr. Tshilidzi Marwala, United Nations University Rector and UN Under-Secretary General, presents the essential technologies used in Game Theory, Mechanism Design and AI and applies these to significant global issues such as interstate conflict, cybersecurity, and energy. International relations are a complex field, with many different actors and interests in play. By incorporating AI into our analysis and decision-making processes, we can better understand and predict the behavior of multiple actors and design mechanisms that take these behaviors into account, thereby producing more desirable and creative interdisciplinary approaches. The book presents real-world applications of these rapidly evolving technologies in crucial research fields such as Interstate Conflict, International Trade, Climate Change, Water management, Energy, cybersecurity, and global finance.

    • Handbook of Game Theory

      • 1st Edition
      • Volume 4
      • September 3, 2014
      • Petyon Young + 1 more
      • English
      • Hardback
        9 7 8 0 4 4 4 5 3 7 6 6 9
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 4 4 4 5 3 7 6 7 6
      The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s.

    • Game Theory and Applications

      • 1st Edition
      • June 28, 2014
      • Tatsuro Ichiishi + 2 more
      • English
      • eBook
        9 7 8 1 4 8 3 2 9 5 0 5 3
      Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.

    • Game Theory for Economic Analysis

      • 1st Edition
      • June 28, 2014
      • Tatsuro Ichiishi
      • English
      • Paperback
        9 7 8 1 4 9 3 3 0 8 6 5 1
      • eBook
        9 7 8 1 4 8 3 2 9 5 0 6 0
      Game Theory for Economic Analysis provides information pertinent to the more general game-theoretical concept. This book discusses fundamental aspects of a social coalitional equilibrium. Organized into six chapters, this book begins with an overview of the mathematical tools and theorems that play critical roles in n-person game theory. This text then provides a systematic account for the first strand of n-person game theory and presents the mathematical foundation for economic analysis. Other chapters consider the concept of Nash equilibrium of a game in normal form, wherein a solution of a game is based on the postulate that each player behaves individualistically and passively. This book discusses as well the central concept of the core of a game in characteristic function form, with or without side-payments. The final chapter deals with the Shapley value of a side-payment game. This book is a valuable resource for economists, economic theorists, and research workers.

    • The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic

      • 2nd Edition
      • December 28, 2012
      • Richard A. Epstein
      • English
      • Paperback
        9 7 8 0 3 2 3 2 8 2 7 5 8
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 1 2 3 9 7 8 7 0 7
      Early in his rise to enlightenment, man invented a concept that has since been variously viewed as a vice, a crime, a business, a pleasure, a type of magic, a disease, a folly, a weakness, a form of sexual substitution, an expression of the human instinct. He invented gambling. Recent advances in the field, particularly Parrondo's paradox, have triggered a surge of interest in the statistical and mathematical theory behind gambling. This interest was acknowledge in the motion picture, "21," inspired by the true story of the MIT students who mastered the art of card counting to reap millions from the Vegas casinos. Richard Epstein's classic book on gambling and its mathematical analysis covers the full range of games from penny matching to blackjack, from Tic-Tac-Toe to the stock market (including Edward Thorp's warrant-hedging analysis). He even considers whether statistical inference can shed light on the study of paranormal phenomena. Epstein is witty and insightful, a pleasure to dip into and read and rewarding to study. The book is written at a fairly sophisticated mathematical level; this is not "Gambling for Dummies" or "How To Beat The Odds Without Really Trying." A background in upper-level undergraduate mathematics is helpful for understanding this work.

    • The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic

      • 2nd Edition
      • September 21, 2009
      • Richard A. Epstein
      • English
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 0 8 0 9 5 8 6 1 3
      Early in his rise to enlightenment, man invented a concept that has since been variously viewed as a vice, a crime, a business, a pleasure, a type of magic, a disease, a folly, a weakness, a form of sexual substitution, an expression of the human instinct. He invented gambling. Recent advances in the field, particularly Parrondo's paradox, have triggered a surge of interest in the statistical and mathematical theory behind gambling. This interest was acknowledge in the motion picture, "21," inspired by the true story of the MIT students who mastered the art of card counting to reap millions from the Vegas casinos. Richard Epstein's classic book on gambling and its mathematical analysis covers the full range of games from penny matching to blackjack, from Tic-Tac-Toe to the stock market (including Edward Thorp's warrant-hedging analysis). He even considers whether statistical inference can shed light on the study of paranormal phenomena. Epstein is witty and insightful, a pleasure to dip into and read and rewarding to study. The book is written at a fairly sophisticated mathematical level; this is not "Gambling for Dummies" or "How To Beat The Odds Without Really Trying." A background in upper-level undergraduate mathematics is helpful for understanding this work.

    • Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

      • 1st Edition
      • Volume 3
      • August 19, 2002
      • R.J. Aumann + 1 more
      • English
      • Hardback
        9 7 8 0 4 4 4 8 9 4 2 8 1
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 0 8 0 5 7 4 7 6 9
      This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners.The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.

    • Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

      • 1st Edition
      • Volume 2
      • December 21, 1994
      • R.J. Aumann + 1 more
      • English
      • Hardback
        9 7 8 0 4 4 4 8 9 4 2 7 4
      • Paperback
        9 7 8 1 4 9 3 3 0 2 7 7 2
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 0 8 0 9 3 4 3 4 1
      This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology.For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier....

    • Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

      • 1st Edition
      • Volume 1
      • November 19, 1992
      • R.J. Aumann + 1 more
      • English
      • Paperback
        9 7 8 1 4 9 3 3 0 2 7 0 3
      • Hardback
        9 7 8 0 4 4 4 8 8 0 9 8 7
      • eBook
        9 7 8 0 0 8 0 9 3 3 9 4 8
      This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines.The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier....