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Handbook of Game Theory
1st Edition - September 3, 2014
Editors: Petyon Young, Shmuel Zamir
Hardback ISBN:9780444537669
9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 3 7 6 6 - 9
eBook ISBN:9780444537676
9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 3 7 6 7 - 6
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of… Read more
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The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s.
Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior
Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory
Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction to the Series
Chapter 1: Rationality
Abstract
1.1 Neoclassical Rationality
1.2 Revealed Preference
1.3 Decisions Under Risk
1.4 Bayesian Decision Theory
1.5 Knowledge
1.6 Nash Equilibrium
1.7 Black Boxes
1.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Chapter 2: Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games
Abstract
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Recursive Structure
2.3 Asymptotic Analysis
2.4 The Dual Game
2.5 Uniform Analysis
2.6 Differential Games
2.7 Approachability
2.8 Alternative tools and topics
2.8.2 The “Limit Game”
2.8.3 Repeated games and differential equations
2.8.4 Multimove games
2.9 Recent Advances
2.9.2 Markov games with incomplete information on both sides
2.9.3 Counter examples for the asymptotic approach
2.9.4 Control problem, martingales, and PDE
2.9.5 New links between discrete and continuous time games
2.9.6 Final comments
Acknowledgments
Chapter 3: Games on Networks
Abstract
3.1 Introduction and Overview
3.2 Background Definitions
3.3 Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes
3.4 A Model with Continuous Actions, Quadratic Payoffs, and Strategic Complementarities
3.5 Network Games with Incomplete Information
3.6 Choosing Both Actions and Links
3.7 Repeated Games and Network Structure
3.8 Concluding Remarks and Further Areas of Research
Acknowledgments
Chapter 4: Reputations in Repeated Games
Abstract
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Reputations With Short-Lived Players
4.2.7 Interpretation
4.2.8 Exogenously informative signals
4.3 Reputations with Two Long-Lived Players
4.4.3 Changing types
4.5 Discussion
Acknowledgments
Chapter 5: Coalition Formation
Abstract
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Framework
5.3 The Blocking Approach: Cooperative Games
5.4 The Bargaining Approach: Noncooperative Games
5.5 The Welfare Economics of Coalition Formation
5.6 Coalition Formation: The Road Ahead
Acknowledgments
Chapter 6: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Abstract
6.1 Evolutionary Dynamics And Equilibrium Selection
6.2 Equilibrium Selection in 2 × 2 Games
6.3 Stochastic Stability in Larger Games
6.4 Bargaining
6.5 Public Goods
6.6 Network Games
6.7 Speed of Convergence
6.8 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 7: Advances in Auctions
Abstract
7.1 Introduction
7.2 First-Price Auctions: Theoretical Advances
7.3 Multiunit Auctions
7.4 Dynamic Auctions
7.5 Externalities in Single-Object Auctions
7.6 Auctions with Resale
7.7 All-Pay Auctions
7.8 Incorporating Behavioral Economics
7.9 Position Auctions in Internet Search
7.10 Spectrum Auctions
7.11 Concluding Remarks
Acknowledgments
Chapter 8: Combinatorial Auctions
Abstract
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Supporting Prices
8.3 Incentives
8.4 Complexity Considerations
Chapter 9: Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions
Abstract
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design and this Survey
9.3 Representation
9.4 Algorithms
9.5 Payments, Incentives, and Mechanisms
9.6 Conclusion
Acknowledgments
Chapter 10: Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling
Abstract
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Cognitive Hierarchy and Level-K Models
10.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium
10.4 Learning
10.6 Sociality
10.7 Conclusion
Chapter 11: Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology
Abstract
11.1 Strategic Analysis—What Matters to Biologists?
11.2 Sex Ratios—How the Spirit of Game Theory Emerged in Biology
11.3 The Empirical Success of Sex-Ratio Theory
11.4 Animal Fighting and the Official Birth of Evolutionary Game Theory
11.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
11.6 Intragenomic Conflict and Willful Passengers
11.7 Cooperation in Microbes and Higher Organisms
11.8 Biological Trade and Markets
11.9 Animal Signaling—Honesty or Deception?
Chapter 12: Epistemic Game Theory
Abstract
12.1 Introduction and Motivation
12.2 Main Ingredients
12.3 Strategic Games of Complete Information
12.4 Equilibrium Concepts
Acknowledgement
Chapter 13: Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
Abstract
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Population Games
13.3 Revision Protocols and Mean Dynamics
13.4 Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
13.5 Families of Evolutionary Dynamics
13.6 Potential Games
13.7 ESS and Contractive Games
13.8 Iterative Solution Concepts, Supermodular Games, and Equilibrium Selection
13.9 Nonconvergence of Evolutionary Dynamics
13.10 Connections and Further Developments
Acknowledgements
Chapter 14: The Complexity of Computing Equilibria
Abstract
14.1 The Task
14.2 Problems and Algorithms
14.3 Good Algorithms
14.4 P and NP
14.5 Reductions and NP-complete Problems
14.6 The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium
14.7 Approximation, Succinctness, and Other Topics
Acknowledgments
Chapter 15: Theory of Combinatorial Games
Abstract
15.1 Motivation and An Ancient Roman War-Game Strategy
15.2 The Classical Theory, Sum of Games, Complexity
15.3 Introducing Draws
15.4 Adding Interactions Between Tokens
15.5 Partizan Games
15.6 Misère Play
15.7 Constraint Logic
15.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgment
Chapter 16: Game Theory and Distributed Control**
Abstract
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Utility Design
16.3 Learning Design
16.4 Exploiting the Engineering Agenda: State-Based Games
16.5 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 17: Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility
Abstract
17.1 Introduction
Part I Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Risk
Part II Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Uncertainty
Acknowledgments
Chapter 18: Calibration and Expert Testing
Abstract
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Terminology and Notation
18.3 Examples
18.4 Calibration
18.5 Negative Results
18.5.2 Prequential Principle
18.5.3 Interpretations
18.6 Positive Results
18.7 Restricting the Class of Allowed Data-Generating Processes
18.8 Multiple Experts
18.9 Bayesian and Decision-Theoretic Approaches to Testing Experts
18.10 Related Topics
Acknowledgment
Index
No. of pages: 1024
Language: English
Published: September 3, 2014
Imprint: North Holland
Hardback ISBN: 9780444537669
eBook ISBN: 9780444537676
PY
Petyon Young
Affiliations and expertise
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
SZ
Shmuel Zamir
Affiliations and expertise
Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel