Handbook of Game Theory

1st Edition, Volume 4 - September 3, 2014
Editors: Petyon Young, Shmuel Zamir
Language: English
Hardback ISBN:
9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 3 7 6 6 - 9
eBook ISBN:
9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 3 7 6 7 - 6

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of… Read more

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The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s.

Preface
- Acknowledgments
Introduction to the Series
Chapter 1: Rationality
- Abstract
- 1.1 Neoclassical Rationality
- 1.2 Revealed Preference
- 1.3 Decisions Under Risk
- 1.4 Bayesian Decision Theory
- 1.5 Knowledge
- 1.6 Nash Equilibrium
- 1.7 Black Boxes
- 1.8 Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 2: Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games
- Abstract
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Recursive Structure
- 2.3 Asymptotic Analysis
- 2.4 The Dual Game
- 2.5 Uniform Analysis
- 2.6 Differential Games
- 2.7 Approachability
- 2.8 Alternative tools and topics
- 2.8.2 The “Limit Game”
- 2.8.3 Repeated games and differential equations
- 2.8.4 Multimove games
- 2.9 Recent Advances
- 2.9.2 Markov games with incomplete information on both sides
- 2.9.3 Counter examples for the asymptotic approach
- 2.9.4 Control problem, martingales, and PDE
- 2.9.5 New links between discrete and continuous time games
- 2.9.6 Final comments
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 3: Games on Networks
- Abstract
- 3.1 Introduction and Overview
- 3.2 Background Definitions
- 3.3 Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes
- 3.4 A Model with Continuous Actions, Quadratic Payoffs, and Strategic Complementarities
- 3.5 Network Games with Incomplete Information
- 3.6 Choosing Both Actions and Links
- 3.7 Repeated Games and Network Structure
- 3.8 Concluding Remarks and Further Areas of Research
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 4: Reputations in Repeated Games
- Abstract
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Reputations With Short-Lived Players
- 4.2.7 Interpretation
- 4.2.8 Exogenously informative signals
- 4.3 Reputations with Two Long-Lived Players
- 4.4.3 Changing types
- 4.5 Discussion
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 5: Coalition Formation
- Abstract
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 The Framework
- 5.3 The Blocking Approach: Cooperative Games
- 5.4 The Bargaining Approach: Noncooperative Games
- 5.5 The Welfare Economics of Coalition Formation
- 5.6 Coalition Formation: The Road Ahead
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 6: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
- Abstract
- 6.1 Evolutionary Dynamics And Equilibrium Selection
- 6.2 Equilibrium Selection in 2 × 2 Games
- 6.3 Stochastic Stability in Larger Games
- 6.4 Bargaining
- 6.5 Public Goods
- 6.6 Network Games
- 6.7 Speed of Convergence
- 6.8 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 7: Advances in Auctions
- Abstract
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 First-Price Auctions: Theoretical Advances
- 7.3 Multiunit Auctions
- 7.4 Dynamic Auctions
- 7.5 Externalities in Single-Object Auctions
- 7.6 Auctions with Resale
- 7.7 All-Pay Auctions
- 7.8 Incorporating Behavioral Economics
- 7.9 Position Auctions in Internet Search
- 7.10 Spectrum Auctions
- 7.11 Concluding Remarks
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 8: Combinatorial Auctions
- Abstract
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Supporting Prices
- 8.3 Incentives
- 8.4 Complexity Considerations
Chapter 9: Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions
- Abstract
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design and this Survey
- 9.3 Representation
- 9.4 Algorithms
- 9.5 Payments, Incentives, and Mechanisms
- 9.6 Conclusion
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 10: Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling
- Abstract
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Cognitive Hierarchy and Level-K Models
- 10.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium
- 10.4 Learning
- 10.6 Sociality
- 10.7 Conclusion
Chapter 11: Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology
- Abstract
- 11.1 Strategic Analysis—What Matters to Biologists?
- 11.2 Sex Ratios—How the Spirit of Game Theory Emerged in Biology
- 11.3 The Empirical Success of Sex-Ratio Theory
- 11.4 Animal Fighting and the Official Birth of Evolutionary Game Theory
- 11.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
- 11.6 Intragenomic Conflict and Willful Passengers
- 11.7 Cooperation in Microbes and Higher Organisms
- 11.8 Biological Trade and Markets
- 11.9 Animal Signaling—Honesty or Deception?
Chapter 12: Epistemic Game Theory
- Abstract
- 12.1 Introduction and Motivation
- 12.2 Main Ingredients
- 12.3 Strategic Games of Complete Information
- 12.4 Equilibrium Concepts
- Acknowledgement
Chapter 13: Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
- Abstract
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 Population Games
- 13.3 Revision Protocols and Mean Dynamics
- 13.4 Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
- 13.5 Families of Evolutionary Dynamics
- 13.6 Potential Games
- 13.7 ESS and Contractive Games
- 13.8 Iterative Solution Concepts, Supermodular Games, and Equilibrium Selection
- 13.9 Nonconvergence of Evolutionary Dynamics
- 13.10 Connections and Further Developments
- Acknowledgements
Chapter 14: The Complexity of Computing Equilibria
- Abstract
- 14.1 The Task
- 14.2 Problems and Algorithms
- 14.3 Good Algorithms
- 14.4 P and NP
- 14.5 Reductions and NP-complete Problems
- 14.6 The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium
- 14.7 Approximation, Succinctness, and Other Topics
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 15: Theory of Combinatorial Games
- Abstract
- 15.1 Motivation and An Ancient Roman War-Game Strategy
- 15.2 The Classical Theory, Sum of Games, Complexity
- 15.3 Introducing Draws
- 15.4 Adding Interactions Between Tokens
- 15.5 Partizan Games
- 15.6 Misère Play
- 15.7 Constraint Logic
- 15.8 Conclusion
- Acknowledgment
Chapter 16: Game Theory and Distributed Control**
- Abstract
- 16.1 Introduction
- 16.2 Utility Design
- 16.3 Learning Design
- 16.4 Exploiting the Engineering Agenda: State-Based Games
- 16.5 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 17: Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility
- Abstract
- 17.1 Introduction
- Part I Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Risk
- Part II Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Uncertainty
- Acknowledgments
Chapter 18: Calibration and Expert Testing
- Abstract
- 18.1 Introduction
- 18.2 Terminology and Notation
- 18.3 Examples
- 18.4 Calibration
- 18.5 Negative Results
- 18.5.2 Prequential Principle
- 18.5.3 Interpretations
- 18.6 Positive Results
- 18.7 Restricting the Class of Allowed Data-Generating Processes
- 18.8 Multiple Experts
- 18.9 Bayesian and Decision-Theoretic Approaches to Testing Experts
- 18.10 Related Topics
- Acknowledgment
Index

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Handbook of Game Theory

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Petyon Young

Shmuel Zamir