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Safety Theory and Control Technology of High-Speed Train Operation
- 1st Edition - October 12, 2017
- Author: Junfeng Wang
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 1 3 3 0 4 - 0
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 1 3 3 0 5 - 7
Safety Theory and Technology of High-Speed Train Operation puts forward solutions for train dispatching and signal control. Frequent railway incidents have threatened the safety of… Read more
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Request a sales quoteSafety Theory and Technology of High-Speed Train Operation puts forward solutions for train dispatching and signal control. Frequent railway incidents have threatened the safety of rail transport. In 2013, more than 12 trains collided. In the same year, a Spanish train derailed due to speed, and two of China’s high-speed trains collided. In 2016, Germany and Italy both experienced serious train collisions. Global railway security is essential. Many accidents are caused by train dispatching errors and signal system failure.
Chinese high-speed railway has developed very quickly and at a very large scale. However, many issues reagrding safety has not been addressed. This book considers the issue from the perspective of a system. A train operation control system structure is put forward in order to ensure safety. Five key technologies (namely system-level fail-safe, parallel monitoring, completeness of train control data, data sharing and fusion and prevention of common errors in monitoring), are proposed. In order to prevent collision, over-speed, derailment, and rear-end collision accidents, the concept and corresponding parallel monitoring technology of five core control items (train route, speed, tracking interval, temporary speed limit, train running state) is proposed.
- Puts forward solutions for train dispatching and signal control
- Views high-speed train safety and technology from a systems-theory perspective
- Describes five key technologies to ensure safety
- Proposes five parallel monitoring technologies to prevent collision, over-speed, derailment and rear-end collision incidents
- Considers the very quick and large-scale development of Chinese high-speed rail
Railway safety managers; control field specialists; railway signal design and standard makers; signal system test and safety evaluation personnel; signal equipment manufacturing, management, operation and maintenance personnel; those involved in the next generation of railway signal technology; researchers, teachers and students specializing in railways; professional railway trainers
1. Development history of train operation safety
1.1 Development process of railway train signals
1.2 Railway train accidents and causes
1.2.1 International major accidents
1.2.2 Cause of the accident and inspiration
1.3 Present situation of train operation safety
1.3.1 Defects existing in signal system
1.3.2 Traditional old signal security concept
1.3.3 Research Progress on safety of train operation
1.4 Existing train safety system
1.4.1 International train safety system
1.4.2 Chinese train safety system
References
2. Existing train safety control technology
2.1 Interval blocking technology
2.1.1 Manual Blocking
2.1.2 Semi-automatic Blocking
2.1.3 Automatic inter station Blocking
2.1.4 Auto-Blocking
2.1.5 Virtual Blocking
2.1.6 Moving Auto-Blocking
2.2 Automatic Train Protection
2.2.1 The "three big pieces" of locomotives
2.2.2 ATP over speed protection
2.3 Station interlocking technology
2.3.1 Development of interlocking technology
2.3.2 Relay interlocking
2.2.3 Computer based Interlocking
2.4 Centralized Traffic Control
2.4.1 Function of Centralized Traffic Control
2.4.2 Principle and structure of Centralized Traffic Control
2.5 Centralized Signalling supervision and Monitoring
2.4.1 Function of supervision and Monitoring system
2.4.2 Characteristics of supervision and Monitoring system
2.4.3 Principle and structure of supervision and Monitoring system
References
3. Theory system and framework of high speed railway train operation safety
3.1 System science and train operation safety
3.1.1 System concepts
3.1.2 Summarize of system science
3.1.3 System science of train operation safety
3.2 The cores of train safety control
3.3 The architectures of train safety control system
3.4 Key technology of train safety control
References
4. System-Level Fail-Safe
4.1 Summarize of Fail-Safe
4.1.1 Concept of Fail-Safe
4.1.2 The characteristics of signal system Fail-Safe technology
4.1.3 Relevant standards of Fail-Safe
4.1.4 Summarize of system-level Fail-Safe
4.2 Theory of the system-level Fail-Safe
4.2.1 Summarize of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.2 Model of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.3 Diagnostic conditions of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.3 System-level Fail-Safe of high-speed railway train control system
4.3.1 The structures and architectures of system-level Fail-Safe
4.3.2 Detection of data completeness of train control
4.3.3 Detection of match of train operation scenario
References
5. Parallel Monitoring
5.1 Summarize of parallel monitoring technology
5.1.1 Concept of parallel monitoring
5.1.2 Application condition of parallel monitoring
5.2 CTC&ATP train tracking interval parallel monitoring based on the theory of the wild goose migration
5.2.1 Existing train tracking interval control theory
5.2.2 Application of theory of the wild goose migration in train tracking interval control
5.2.3 Train tracking interval control based on CTC
5.2.4 Train tracking interval control based on CTC&ATP
5.3 Train route parallel monitoring based on virtual image technique
5.3.1 Existing train route control theory and its problems
5.3.2 Train route control method based on virtual image technique
5.3.3 Model of train route parallel monitoring
5.4 Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.4.1 The system structure of Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.4.2 Comparison strategy of Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.5 Temporary speed restriction parallel monitoring
5.5.1 Existing operating principle of train temporary speed restriction
5.5.2 Temporary speed restriction parallel monitoring method
6. Sigma completeness of train control data
6.1 Data of train control and train operation scenario
6.2 Formal modeling of data completeness of train control
6.2.1 Formal modeling and review of verification methods
6.2.2 The formal modeling foundation of train control data
6.2.3 System structure for the sigma completeness model of train control data
6.2.4 Formal modeling objectives for the of train control data
6.3 Fault diagnosis based on sigma completeness of train control data
6.3.1 Summary
6.3.2 The realization of feature extraction and mining rules based on the sigma completeness of the train control data
6.3.3 Train fault early warning analysis model and algorithm based on the sigma completeness of train control data
6.3.4 Diagnosis case analysis
6.4 Analysis of data completeness of train control and safety impact
References
7. Data Sharing, data fusion and avoid common cause failure
7.1 Data sharing of train control
7.2 The method of data fusion of train control system
7.3 Avoid common cause failure
References
8. Real-time supervision and prewarning of train operation status and operation behavior
8.1 Application of big data theory in supervision and prewarning
8.1.1Signaling systems big data
8.1.2 Real-time analysis method of big data
8.1.3 Data mining method based on big data
8.2 Train operation status supervision
8.3 Operation behavior supervision
8.4 Maintenance operation monitoring and tracking
8.4.1 Real-time design of maintenance schemes based on big data
8.4.2Train operation safety under the emergency command condition
8.5 Closed-loop supervision of train control facilities and human factors
8.5.1 Train control facilities supervision
8.5.2 Human factors supervision
References
9. The train operation control and Intelligent dispatch
9.1 The integration of train operation control and dispatch command
9.1.1 Present situation of train operation control and dispatch command
9.1.2 Overseas and domestic research status and their contrastive analysis
9.1.3 How to achieve the integration of train operation control and dispatch command
9.2 Train intelligent aided dispatch based on big data
References
10. Failure mechanism and risk control of train control system
10.1 Failure causing factors of high speed railway signal system
10.2 Failure caused by structural problems of high speed railway signal system
10.3 External interference leads to the failure of high speed railway signal system
10.4 Failure of the internal equipment leads to the failure of the high speed railway signal system
10.5 Risk control method for train control system
10.5.1 Risk control based on parallel monitoring technology
10.5.2 Risk control based on the sigmacompleteness of the train control data
10.5.3 Risk control based on data sharing and fusion technology
References
11. Safety analysis method for train control system
11.1 Qualitative analysis method
11.1.1 Safety check list analysis
11.1.2 Preliminary hazard analysis
11.1.3 Failure modes and effects analysis
11.1.4 Hazard and operability studies analysis
11.2 Quantitative analysis method
11.2.1 Fault tree analysis
11.2.2 Event tree analysis
11.2.3 Markov analysis
11.2.4 Petri network analysis
References
12. Safety evaluation method for train control system
12.1 The purpose and basic principles of system security assessment
12.1.1 The purpose of system security evaluation
12.1.2 The basic principles of system security assessment
12.2 The implementation phase of system security evaluation
12.2.1 Stage division and work focus
12.2.2 The corresponding relationship between test verification and design development
12.3 The implementation of system security assessment
References
1.1 Development process of railway train signals
1.2 Railway train accidents and causes
1.2.1 International major accidents
1.2.2 Cause of the accident and inspiration
1.3 Present situation of train operation safety
1.3.1 Defects existing in signal system
1.3.2 Traditional old signal security concept
1.3.3 Research Progress on safety of train operation
1.4 Existing train safety system
1.4.1 International train safety system
1.4.2 Chinese train safety system
References
2. Existing train safety control technology
2.1 Interval blocking technology
2.1.1 Manual Blocking
2.1.2 Semi-automatic Blocking
2.1.3 Automatic inter station Blocking
2.1.4 Auto-Blocking
2.1.5 Virtual Blocking
2.1.6 Moving Auto-Blocking
2.2 Automatic Train Protection
2.2.1 The "three big pieces" of locomotives
2.2.2 ATP over speed protection
2.3 Station interlocking technology
2.3.1 Development of interlocking technology
2.3.2 Relay interlocking
2.2.3 Computer based Interlocking
2.4 Centralized Traffic Control
2.4.1 Function of Centralized Traffic Control
2.4.2 Principle and structure of Centralized Traffic Control
2.5 Centralized Signalling supervision and Monitoring
2.4.1 Function of supervision and Monitoring system
2.4.2 Characteristics of supervision and Monitoring system
2.4.3 Principle and structure of supervision and Monitoring system
References
3. Theory system and framework of high speed railway train operation safety
3.1 System science and train operation safety
3.1.1 System concepts
3.1.2 Summarize of system science
3.1.3 System science of train operation safety
3.2 The cores of train safety control
3.3 The architectures of train safety control system
3.4 Key technology of train safety control
References
4. System-Level Fail-Safe
4.1 Summarize of Fail-Safe
4.1.1 Concept of Fail-Safe
4.1.2 The characteristics of signal system Fail-Safe technology
4.1.3 Relevant standards of Fail-Safe
4.1.4 Summarize of system-level Fail-Safe
4.2 Theory of the system-level Fail-Safe
4.2.1 Summarize of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.2 Model of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.3 Diagnostic conditions of the system-level fault diagnosis
4.3 System-level Fail-Safe of high-speed railway train control system
4.3.1 The structures and architectures of system-level Fail-Safe
4.3.2 Detection of data completeness of train control
4.3.3 Detection of match of train operation scenario
References
5. Parallel Monitoring
5.1 Summarize of parallel monitoring technology
5.1.1 Concept of parallel monitoring
5.1.2 Application condition of parallel monitoring
5.2 CTC&ATP train tracking interval parallel monitoring based on the theory of the wild goose migration
5.2.1 Existing train tracking interval control theory
5.2.2 Application of theory of the wild goose migration in train tracking interval control
5.2.3 Train tracking interval control based on CTC
5.2.4 Train tracking interval control based on CTC&ATP
5.3 Train route parallel monitoring based on virtual image technique
5.3.1 Existing train route control theory and its problems
5.3.2 Train route control method based on virtual image technique
5.3.3 Model of train route parallel monitoring
5.4 Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.4.1 The system structure of Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.4.2 Comparison strategy of Onboard ATP device and ground ATP device speed parallel monitoring
5.5 Temporary speed restriction parallel monitoring
5.5.1 Existing operating principle of train temporary speed restriction
5.5.2 Temporary speed restriction parallel monitoring method
6. Sigma completeness of train control data
6.1 Data of train control and train operation scenario
6.2 Formal modeling of data completeness of train control
6.2.1 Formal modeling and review of verification methods
6.2.2 The formal modeling foundation of train control data
6.2.3 System structure for the sigma completeness model of train control data
6.2.4 Formal modeling objectives for the of train control data
6.3 Fault diagnosis based on sigma completeness of train control data
6.3.1 Summary
6.3.2 The realization of feature extraction and mining rules based on the sigma completeness of the train control data
6.3.3 Train fault early warning analysis model and algorithm based on the sigma completeness of train control data
6.3.4 Diagnosis case analysis
6.4 Analysis of data completeness of train control and safety impact
References
7. Data Sharing, data fusion and avoid common cause failure
7.1 Data sharing of train control
7.2 The method of data fusion of train control system
7.3 Avoid common cause failure
References
8. Real-time supervision and prewarning of train operation status and operation behavior
8.1 Application of big data theory in supervision and prewarning
8.1.1Signaling systems big data
8.1.2 Real-time analysis method of big data
8.1.3 Data mining method based on big data
8.2 Train operation status supervision
8.3 Operation behavior supervision
8.4 Maintenance operation monitoring and tracking
8.4.1 Real-time design of maintenance schemes based on big data
8.4.2Train operation safety under the emergency command condition
8.5 Closed-loop supervision of train control facilities and human factors
8.5.1 Train control facilities supervision
8.5.2 Human factors supervision
References
9. The train operation control and Intelligent dispatch
9.1 The integration of train operation control and dispatch command
9.1.1 Present situation of train operation control and dispatch command
9.1.2 Overseas and domestic research status and their contrastive analysis
9.1.3 How to achieve the integration of train operation control and dispatch command
9.2 Train intelligent aided dispatch based on big data
References
10. Failure mechanism and risk control of train control system
10.1 Failure causing factors of high speed railway signal system
10.2 Failure caused by structural problems of high speed railway signal system
10.3 External interference leads to the failure of high speed railway signal system
10.4 Failure of the internal equipment leads to the failure of the high speed railway signal system
10.5 Risk control method for train control system
10.5.1 Risk control based on parallel monitoring technology
10.5.2 Risk control based on the sigmacompleteness of the train control data
10.5.3 Risk control based on data sharing and fusion technology
References
11. Safety analysis method for train control system
11.1 Qualitative analysis method
11.1.1 Safety check list analysis
11.1.2 Preliminary hazard analysis
11.1.3 Failure modes and effects analysis
11.1.4 Hazard and operability studies analysis
11.2 Quantitative analysis method
11.2.1 Fault tree analysis
11.2.2 Event tree analysis
11.2.3 Markov analysis
11.2.4 Petri network analysis
References
12. Safety evaluation method for train control system
12.1 The purpose and basic principles of system security assessment
12.1.1 The purpose of system security evaluation
12.1.2 The basic principles of system security assessment
12.2 The implementation phase of system security evaluation
12.2.1 Stage division and work focus
12.2.2 The corresponding relationship between test verification and design development
12.3 The implementation of system security assessment
References
- No. of pages: 398
- Language: English
- Edition: 1
- Published: October 12, 2017
- Imprint: Academic Press
- Paperback ISBN: 9780128133040
- eBook ISBN: 9780128133057
JW
Junfeng Wang
Junfeng Wang is a Professor and the Vice Director of the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University. He received his Ph.D. degree from Beijing Jiaotong University, China; and has participated in several major projects on high-speed trains funded by the Chinese government in 2002. His research interests include intelligent transportation systems, communication-based train control, Radio Based Cab-Signaling, fault diagnosis, system reliability and safety, system-level fail-safe, mutual-discipline control studies in the high speed railway signaling system.
Affiliations and expertise
Professor and the Vice Director of the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, ChinaRead Safety Theory and Control Technology of High-Speed Train Operation on ScienceDirect