Research in Law and Economics
A Journal of Policy
- 1st Edition, Volume 22 - February 15, 2007
- Latest edition
- Editors: John B. Kirkwood, Richard O. Zerbe
- Language: English
* John Connor describes and evaluates the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges. * Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only in… Read more
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Description
Description
* John Connor describes and evaluates the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges.
* Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets.
* Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger.
* Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis.
* Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They shows that such a cause of action incarease incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost. the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflects theri awareness of this trade-off.
* Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets.
* Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger.
* Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis.
* Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They shows that such a cause of action incarease incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost. the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflects theri awareness of this trade-off.
Key features
Key features
*Each chapter examines in depth a topic in law and economics.
*Written by leading experts in the field.
*Written by leading experts in the field.
Readership
Readership
* Researchers and academics in economics and business
Table of contents
Table of contents
Lays vs. Wages: Contracting in The Klondike Gold Rush
Allen, Douglas W.
Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy
Chen, Zhiqi
Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition
Coate, Malcolm B. & Williams, Mark D.
Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence
Connor, John M.
Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record
Dalton, James A. & Esposito, Louis
On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short run player
Lando, Henrik
Should Victims of Exposure to a Toxic Substance Have an Independent Claim for Medical Monitoring?
Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen
Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust
Weisman, Dennis L.
Allen, Douglas W.
Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy
Chen, Zhiqi
Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition
Coate, Malcolm B. & Williams, Mark D.
Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence
Connor, John M.
Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial Record
Dalton, James A. & Esposito, Louis
On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short run player
Lando, Henrik
Should Victims of Exposure to a Toxic Substance Have an Independent Claim for Medical Monitoring?
Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen
Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Antitrust
Weisman, Dennis L.
Product details
Product details
- Edition: 1
- Latest edition
- Volume: 22
- Published: February 15, 2007
- Language: English
About the editors
About the editors
JK
John B. Kirkwood
Affiliations and expertise
Seattle University School of Law, Seattle, WA, USARZ
Richard O. Zerbe
Appointed to the Evans School in 1981, Professor Zerbe teaches environmental ethics, microeconomics, government regulation, law and economics and benefit cost analysis. He has an adjunct appointment with law. Professor Zerbe serves as a consultant to the Federal Trade Commission and other government agencies and is also editor of the research journal Research in Law and Economics. He has had appointments at the University of Chicago, the American Bar Foundation, a visiting appointment at Northwestern University and a fellowship to Yale Law School. He was on the executive board of the Western Economic Association and a founding member of the American Law and Economics Association when he also served on the board. He is author of over 100 publications.
Affiliations and expertise
University of Washington, Seattle, WA, U.S.A.