Handbook of the Economics of Matching
- 1st Edition, Volume 1 - December 5, 2024
- Editors: Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre A. Chiappori, Bernard Salanié
- Language: English
- Hardback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 3 - 3 1 4 6 6 - 7
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 3 - 3 1 4 6 7 - 4
This first volume of the Handbook of the Economics of Matching summarizes both classic results and the many recent advances on matching with transfers. Its five chapters, writte… Read more
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Request a sales quote- Provides up-to-date reviews from leading economists on matching markets
- Covers both economic theory, econometric methods, and applications
- Sketches avenues for future research.
- Cover image
- Title page
- Table of Contents
- Copyright
- Contributors
- Preface
- References
- Chapter 1: Frictionless one-to-one matching with transfers: Theory
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Introductory example
- 3 Mathematical framework: the one-dimensional case
- 4 Mathematical framework: the multidimensional case
- 5 Conclusion and discussion
- References
- Chapter 2: Matching with transfers: Applications
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Separable models
- 3 Computation and inference in separable models
- 4 Extensions of separable models
- 5 Applications of separable models
- 6 Non-separable models
- 7 Matching with frictions
- 8 Concluding remarks
- References
- Chapter 3: Matching under imperfectly transferable utility: Submitted as a draft chapter for the Handbook of the Economics of Matching, edited by Che, Chiappori and Salanié
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Pairwise bargaining sets
- 3 Stable matchings without heterogeneity
- 4 Stable matchings with heterogeneity
- 5 The ITU-logit model
- 6 Estimation
- 7 Remarks and discussions
- 8 Related literature
- References
- Chapter 4: Investment and competitive matching
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 An illustrative example
- 3 The model
- 4 Ex-ante equilibrium with transferable utility
- 5 Ex-post equilibrium with transferable utility
- 6 Nontransferable utility
- 7 Discussion
- References
- Chapter 5: Matching with incomplete information
- Abstract
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Canonical matching models with incomplete information
- 3 A prior-free approach
- 4 A Bayesian approach
- 5 The preference revelation game approach
- 6 Open questions and further research
- References
- No. of pages: 1000
- Language: English
- Edition: 1
- Volume: 1
- Published: December 5, 2024
- Imprint: North Holland
- Hardback ISBN: 9780443314667
- eBook ISBN: 9780443314674
YC
Yeon-Koo Che
Yeon-Koo Che is the Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University, where he has taught since 2005. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a Fellow of the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory, and a Fellow of Game Theory. He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the Cho Rakkyo Prize and the KAEA-MK Prize in 2009, and of nine National Science Foundation grants spanning over 20 years. Professor Che published over 60 papers, on topics ranging from market design, auction theory, law and economics, contest theory, matching theory, and data-driven decision making.
PC
Pierre A. Chiappori
BS
Bernard Salanié
Bernard Salanié is the Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics at Columbia University, where he has taught since 2005. He was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2001 and he served as its Executive Vice-President from 2014 to 2018. He is also an elected Fellow of the International Association for Applied Econometrics and of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. Professor Salanié is the author of three graduate textbooks and more than 80 papers. His research interests range from microeconomic theory to econometric methods. His best-known contributions investigate asymmetric information, behavior under risk, and matching.