Editorial foreword, E Y Rodin. Formal theories of politics: the scope of mathematical modelling in political science, P E Johnson. Multidimensional Models of Legislative Decision. Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games, S L Feld, B Grofman & N R Miller. Smooth social choice, N Schofield. Spatial Competition Among Candidates for Public Office. A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions, J H Aldrich & M D McGinnis. Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules, G W Cox. The location of American Presidential candidates: an empirical test of a new spatial model of elections, J M Enelow & M J Hinich. A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences, A Glazer, B Grofman & G Owen. Reputational dynamics in spatial competition, D E Ingberman. Game and Decision Theory. Political decision making with costly and imperfect information, R L Calvert. Advantageous multiple rent seeking, M Gradstein & S Nitzan. The geographical imperatives of the balance of power in 3-country systems, E M S Niou & P C Ordeshook. Dynamic Models. Noncompliance and the limits of coercion: the problematic enforcement of unpopular laws, R Huckfeldt. Coercion and revolution: variations on a predator-prey model, G Tsebelis & J Sprague. Probability Models. Mathematical contributions to the scientific understanding of war, C Cioffi-Revilla. A distribution of extreme inequality with applications to conflict behavior: a geometric derivation of the Pareto distribution, M I Midlarsky. Artificial Intelligence. Short-term prediction of international behavior using a Holland classifier, P A Schrodt.