The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs
An Empirical Analysis
- 1st Edition - January 28, 1983
- Imprint: Academic Press
- Author: Réal P. Lavergne
- Editor: Karl Shell
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN:9 7 8 - 1 - 4 8 3 2 - 4 2 4 3 - 9
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 1 - 4 8 3 2 - 7 1 2 3 - 1
The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional… Read more
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Request a sales quoteThe Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others. Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors. This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis.
Preface1 Introduction I. Interest and Nature of the Subject Matter II. Previous Work2 Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy I. An Economic Model of Decision-Making by Politicians II. The Role of Pressure Groups III. Response to Pressure IV. Remaining Pressure Points V. Conclusion Appendix: The Trade Agreements Program3 Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure I. Introduction II. The Equilibrium Approach III. Problems with the Equilibrium Approach IV. Implications for Empirical Research4 Measures of Protection I. Nominal and Effective Tariffs II. Possible Use of Input Duties as a Regressor III. Nominal and Effective Tariffs: A Corollary IV. Nontariff Barriers V. Summary Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Tariff and NTB Data5 The Comparative Disadvantage Variables I. Introduction II. Hypothesized Relationship Between Tariffs and Comparative Disadvantage III. Previous Work IV. Measurement V. Summary Appendix: Tariffs, Rents, and Quasi-Rents6 Other Hypotheses and Variables I. Tariffs and Pressure Groups II. Displacement Costs III. Tariffs as a Product of International Negotiation IV. Tariff Structure as a Remnant from the Past V. Tariffs and the Public Interest VI. Summary of Variables Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Exogenous Variables7 Empirical Results I. Introduction II. The Explanatory Power of the Model III. Interest Groups IV. Displacement Costs V. Comparative Disadvantage VI. Historical Continuity VII. Bargaining VIII. Miscellany Appendix: Experiments Performed8 ConclusionReferencesIndex
- Edition: 1
- Published: January 28, 1983
- No. of pages (eBook): 224
- Imprint: Academic Press
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN: 9781483242439
- eBook ISBN: 9781483271231
KS
Karl Shell
Affiliations and expertise
Cornell UniversityRead The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs on ScienceDirect