The Political Economy of Antitrust
- 1st Edition, Volume 282 - March 2, 2007
- Imprint: Elsevier Science
- Editors: Vivek Ghosal, Johan Stennek
- Language: English
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 0 8 - 0 5 2 2 9 2 - 0
Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research,… Read more
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Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners.
The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels.
While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume.
The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels.
While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume.
*Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research
*Brings together contributions by leading academic researchers
*Makes a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners
*Brings together contributions by leading academic researchers
*Makes a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners
Economists: Academic Researchers, Post-grad Students and some Professionals
Chapter 1: “Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,” Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 2: “Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.” Stephen Martin (Purdue University).
Chapter 3: “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.” Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).
Chapter 4: “Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?” Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).
Chapter 5: “Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.” Cécile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).
Chapter 6: “Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.” William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).
Chapter 7: “Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels” John Connor (Purdue University).
Chapter 8: “The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.” Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).
Chapter 9: “The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.” Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).
Chapter 10: “The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.” Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 11: “A Consumers’ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.” Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 12: “EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.” Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).
Chapter 13: “The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.” Jérôme Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Valérie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).
Chapter 14: “Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.” Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).
Chapter 15: “Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.” Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).
Chapter 16: “Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.” Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).
Chapter 17: “Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?” Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).
Chapter 18: “Antitrust in Open Economies.” Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).
Chapter 2: “Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.” Stephen Martin (Purdue University).
Chapter 3: “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.” Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).
Chapter 4: “Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?” Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).
Chapter 5: “Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.” Cécile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).
Chapter 6: “Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.” William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).
Chapter 7: “Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels” John Connor (Purdue University).
Chapter 8: “The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.” Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).
Chapter 9: “The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.” Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).
Chapter 10: “The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.” Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 11: “A Consumers’ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.” Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 12: “EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.” Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).
Chapter 13: “The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.” Jérôme Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Valérie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).
Chapter 14: “Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.” Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).
Chapter 15: “Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.” Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).
Chapter 16: “Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.” Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).
Chapter 17: “Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?” Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).
Chapter 18: “Antitrust in Open Economies.” Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).
- Edition: 1
- Volume: 282
- Published: March 2, 2007
- Imprint: Elsevier Science
- Language: English
VG
Vivek Ghosal
Dr. Ghosal received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Florida (USA). Before joining the faculty at Georgia Institute of Technology in 2001, he was an Economist at the Antitrust Division (U.S. Department of Justice) where he worked on issues related to mergers, horizontal and vertical market power, tying agreements, joint ventures, price-fixing and cross-subsidization. Some of the industries he was involved in investigating included electricity, natural gas, coal, information technology, database management systems, radio broadcasting, oilfield drilling services and postal markets. While at the Antitrust Division, the investigative procedures and competition advocacy issues lead him to interact with other governmental agencies such as the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Department of State.
His current areas of research include: political economy of antitrust enforcement; development of price and structural screens for detecting cartels; antitrust evaluation of mergers in electric generation and information technology markets; innovation strategy and competition in the automobile industry; effectiveness of U.S. and European healthcare systems; competition assessments of economic regulations; impact of uncertainty and sunk costs on industry dynamics; and efficiency, innovation and M&As in the pulp and paper industry. He has published in several peer reviewed journals including the Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, World Competition Law and Economics Review, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Review of Industrial Organization, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Inquiry, Economic Issues, Economics Letters and Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. In addition he has a book chapter “Economics, Politics and Merger Control” published in Recent Advances in Antitrust Enforcement (MIT Press). Dr. Ghosal is a Research Fellow at CESifo (Munich).
Affiliations and expertise
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USAJS
Johan Stennek
Johan Stennek is an associate professor in economics, working at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics in Stockholm, Sweden.
His fields of research are industrial economics, competition policy and regulatory issues, currently focusing on (i) mergers & acquisitions, (ii) markets with few sellers and few buyers (bilateral oligopoly), and (iii) electronic communications.
Professor Stennek is active as an economic expert in competition and regulation cases for major Swedish and European corporations, as well as the European Commission and the Swedish Government. He is affiliated to the CEPR and the Swedish Competition Authority’s Council for Competition Research.
Affiliations and expertise
Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm, SwedenRead The Political Economy of Antitrust on ScienceDirect