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Books in Market structure and pricing

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    • Credit Data and Scoring

      • 1st Edition
      • January 7, 2020
      • Eric Rosenblatt
      • English
      • Paperback
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      • eBook
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      Credit Data and Scoring: The First Triumph of Big Data and Big Algorithms illuminates the often-hidden practice of predicting an individual’s economic responsibility. Written by a leading practitioner, it examines the international implications of US leadership in credit scoring and what other countries have learned from it in building their own systems. Through its comprehensive contemporary perspective, the book also explores how algorithms and big data are driving the future of credit scoring. By revealing a new big picture and data comparisons, it delivers useful insights into legal, regulatory and data manipulation.

    • Pricing and Price Regulation

      • 1st Edition
      • Volume 34
      • December 4, 2015
      • D. Bös
      • English
      • Paperback
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      • eBook
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      This clear, precisely written text presents an important branch of the modern, micro-economically based theory of industrial organization and of public finance, utilizing calculus only.Answers are provided to some pertinent economic questions, such as the pricing policies of vote-seeking politicians, of empire-building bureaucrats and of out-put-maximizing and energy-saving public utilities. These policies are compared with the welfare economic benchmark rules e.g. on marginal cost pricing and Ramsey pricing. Great significance is attached to price regulation.The book elucidates the recent replacement of rate of return regulation by price-cap regulation. It also explains why many simple rules like yardstick regulation fail to achieve optimal prices, which shows how complicated it is to induce managers to truthfully reveal their private information. How this can be achieved properly is shown in various principal-agent models on regulation with uncertain costs, uncertain demand and with soft budget constraints.