Rationality

I: Introduction

• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Rationality and its Contexts
  • Abstract
  • Acknowledgments

II: Science

• Introduction
• Chapter 2: Bayesian Psychology and Human Rationality
  • Abstract
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. The standard picture and the standard empirical challenge
  • 2.3. The standard challenge to human rationality
  • 2.4. Rationality reanimated
  • 2.5. Rationality rechallenged
  • Acknowledgments
• Chapter 3: Scientific Rationality: Phlogiston as a Case Study
  • Abstract
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Chang on retaining phlogiston
  • 3.3. Evaluating the benefits of retaining phlogiston
  • 3.4. The rationality of eliminating/retaining phlogiston
  • 3.5. Scientific rationality more generally
  • 3.6. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments
• Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Differences in Thinking: Some Thoughts on Psychological Paradigms
  • Abstract
  • 4.1. Introduction: a universal mind game
  • 4.2. Piecemeal intellectual endeavours
  • 4.3. Is the psychology of thinking inherently culturally biased toward explaining western behavior?
  • 4.4. A holistic analysis of holistic versus analytic thinking
  • 4.5. Some thought experiments
  • 4.6. What of cognitive universals?
  • 4.7. Resolutions

III: Pathology

• Introduction
• Chapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of Rationality
  • Abstract
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.2. The epistemic conception of delusion
  • 5.3. The absence of reasoning deficits
  • 5.4. The challenge from cognitive neuropsychiatry
  • 5.5. The demarcation challenge
  • 5.6. The functional conception of delusion
  • 5.7. Conclusions
• Chapter 6: Outline of a Theory of Delusion: Irrationality and Pathological Belief
  • Abstract
  • 6.1. Delusions
  • 6.2. A social theory of delusion
  • 6.3. Rationality redux: formulating the problem
• Chapter 7: Is Depressive Rumination Rational?
  • Abstract
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. The analytical rumination hypothesis
  • 7.3. Rumination
  • 7.4. Rumination and the resting state hypothesis of MDD
  • 7.5. The resting state, depressive rumination, and rationality
  • 7.6. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgments

IV: Irrationality

• Introduction
• Chapter 8: Reason and Unreason in Chinese Philosophy
  • Abstract
  • 8.1. Incommensurability thesis
  • 8.2. The very idea of correlative thinking
  • 8.3. Ineffability of yi (oneness) in Zhuangzi’s daoism
  • 8.4. In what sense is yi ineffable or unnamable?
  • 8.5. Transcendence of logic and rationality in Zen Buddhism
  • 8.6. Does zen transcend logic and rationality?
  • 8.7. Conclusions
• Chapter 9: Irrationally Intelligible or Rationally Unintelligible?
  • Abstract
  • 9.1. Introduction
  • 9.2. The semantic concept of truth in ancient Chinese philosophy
  • 9.3. Paradoxical expressions and the white horse paradox
  • 9.4. Charity and humanity
• Chapter 10: Does Classical Chinese Philosophy Reveal Alternative Rationalities?
  • Abstract
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. Identifying different rationality by identifying different logic
  • 10.3. Attribution of inconsistency and different logic: a circular argument
  • 10.4. Attribution of inconsistencies and different paradigm of rationality: an alternative defence
  • 10.5. Assumption of consistency in the interpretation of multiple authors texts
  • 10.6. Conclusions

V: Nonhuman

• Introduction
• Chapter 11: Bridging the Logic-Based and Probability-Based Approaches to Artificial Intelligence
  • Abstract
  • 11.1. Introduction
  • 11.2. Two systems to switch between
  • 11.3. Modeling systems 1.5 and 2.0
  • 11.4. What rationality permits
  • 11.5. Reasonable nonmonotonic logic?
  • 11.6. Main results
  • 11.7. Concluding remarks
  • Acknowledgments
• Chapter 12: Rationality and Escherichia Coli
  • Abstract
  • 12.1. Introduction
  • 12.2. Three theses and their inconsistency
  • 12.3. Possible solutions and E. coli’s rationality
  • 12.4. Objections and replies
  • 12.5. Further questions

VI: Communication and emotion

• Introduction
• Chapter 13: Rational Belief and Evidence-Based Update
  • Abstract
  • 13.1. Introduction
  • 13.2. Reliability of testimony
  • 13.3. Rational acceptance
  • 13.4. Reliability and update
  • 13.5. Rational update
  • Acknowledgments
• Chapter 14: Reason and Emotion in Xunzi’s Moral Psychology
• Abstract
• 14.1. Soek’s two models
• 14.2. The high reason model
• 14.3. The high reason model and Xunzi’s moral psychology
• 14.4. Clarification of the concepts: xin and qing
• 14.5. The roles xin and qing play in moral reasoning
• 14.6. Moral reasoning as conscious cost-benefit analysis
• 14.7. More on the role qing plays in the reasoning process
• 14.8. Xunzi’s hybrid model and his conception of moral reason
• Acknowledgments