Public Enterprise Economics

PrefaceTechnical Note Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Normative and Positive Theory 1.2 The Public Enterprise 1.3 Nationalization of Enterprise 1.4 Privatization: A Swelling Tide? 1.5 Socialization of Commodities 1.6 Optimal Qualities 1.7 Optimal Price SchedulesPart One The Basic Model Chapter 2 Essential Parts of Public Sector Pricing Models 2.1 Objectives I: Normative Theory 2.2 Objectives II: Positive Theory 2.3 Constraints I: Markets 2.4 Constraints II: Production 2.5 Constraints III: Finance Chapter 3 Normative Optimum Theory 3.1 The Actors and their Instruments 3.2 Solving the Model 3.3 The Conditions for Optimal Prices and Quantities 3.4 Compensating for Income Effects 3.5 The Conditions for Optimal Quality Chapter 4 Positive Optimum Theory Chapter 5 Normative Piecemeal Theory 5.1 On the Difference Between Optimum and Piecemeal Policies 5.2 Welfare Improvements with Non-Tight Constraints 5.3 Welfare Improvements with Tight Technology Constraint 5.4 On Welfare-Improving Increases of Public Inefficiency 5.5 Piecemeal Policy Recommendations: General Rules for Some Special Cases Chapter 6 Positive Piecemeal Theory 6.1 Improvements with Tight and Non-Tight Constraints 6.2 The Trade-Off Between Efficiency and Market EquilibriumPart Two Normative Theory: Public Pricing Policies for Welfare Maximization A Basic Rules Chapter 7 Marginal-Cost Pricing 7.1 Optimum Policy 7.2 Regulating Marginal-Cost Prices 7.3 Consequences for Allocation, Distribution, and Stabilization 7.4 Piecemeal Policy Chapter 8 Ramsey Pricing 8.1 Optimum Ramsey Policy 8.2 Regulating Ramsey Prices 8.3 Influence of Ramsey Prices on Allocation, Distribution, and Stabilization 8.4 A Piecemeal Policy Interpretation of the Ramsey Optimum Chapter 9 Rate of Return Regulation 9.1 An Intuitive Introduction 9.2 A More Rigorous Treatment 9.3 Welfare Versus Profit Maximization: The Averch-Johnson Effect Chapter 10 Pricing with Distributional Aims 10.1 Prices Versus Taxes 10.2 Feldstein Pricing 10.3 Comparing Distributional and Allocative Pricing B Interdependencies with the Private Economy Chapter 11 Adjustment to Monopolistic Pricing in the Private Sector 11.1 The Second-Best Issue: Adjustment to, Versus Interference in, the Private Economy 11.2 A Model for Public Prices in an Imperfect Market Economy 11.3 A Duopoly Model for Public Prices Chapter12 Adjustment to Rationed Markets 12.1 Rationed Labor Market 12.2 Capacity Limits of Public Transportation C Time-Dependent Pricing Chapter 13 Pricing through Time and Adjustment Clauses Chapter 14 Peak-Load Pricing 14.1 Setting the Problem 14.2 A Model with Excess Demand and Rationing D Public Pricing When Quality Matters Chapter 15 Different Approaches Towards Optimal Quality 15.1 Quality I: Distinguishing Different Goods 15.2 Quality II: Using Continuous Quality IndicatorsPart Three Positive Theory: Public Pricing Policies to Achieve Politicians' and Managers' Aims A Politicians and Bureaucrats Chapter 16 Winning Votes Chapter 17 Maximizing Budgets B Managers of Public Enterprises and Unions Chapter 18 Maximizing Output or Revenue, Minimizing Energy Inputs Chapter 19 Minimizing Price Indices Chapter 20 The Influence of Unions Chapter 21 Quality in Positive Theory Models Chapter 22 A Set of Axioms for Prices to Achieve a Fair Allocation of CostsPart Four Application of the Theoretical Results: The Example of London Transport Chapter 23 Economic Theory and Empirical Analysis (I): Specifying Demand 23.1 Microeconomics of the Representative Consumer 23.2 Some Basic Principles for Estimating Systems of Demand Functions 23.3 Desirable Properties of a Demand System 23.4 The Almost Ideal Demand System Chapter 24 Economic Theory and Empirical Analysis (II): Specifying Technology 24.1 Duality 24.2 Some Basic Principles of Estimating Technology 24.3 Desirable Properties of the Firm's Technology Representation 24.4 Long-Run Versus Short-Run Marginal Costs Chapter 25 Bus and Underground Services in London 25.1 Recent Organizational and Political History 25.2 Recent Economic History 25.3 Empirical Studies on Bus and Underground Demand 25.4 Empirical Studies on Bus and Underground Costs Chapter 26 Estimating Normative and Positive Prices for Bus and Underground in London 26.1 The AIDS Specification of Demand 26.2 The Translog Specification of Factor Demand Functions 26.3 Optimal Prices for London Bus and Underground ServicesAppendices Appendix 1 The Size of the Public Enterprise Sector in Europe Appendix 2 The Size of the Government and Regulated Enterprise Sector in the United States 431List of SymbolsReferencesIndex