Nuclear Decommissioning Case Studies
Safety, Environmental and Security Rules
- 1st Edition, Volume 4 - April 16, 2022
- Imprint: Academic Press
- Author: Michele Laraia
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 3 2 3 - 9 1 8 4 7 - 3
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 3 2 3 - 9 1 5 1 9 - 9
Nuclear Decommissioning Case Studies: Safety, Environmental and Security Rules, Volume Four in Michele Laraia’s series that presents a selection of global case studies on different… Read more
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Request a sales quoteNuclear Decommissioning Case Studies: Safety, Environmental and Security Rules, Volume Four in Michele Laraia’s series that presents a selection of global case studies on different aspects of Nuclear Decommissioning, focuses on the people side, including public perception, public relations and human factors. The book presents a selection of case studies on stakeholders, socioeconomics and more, providing readers with a guide on how to deal with common, often contentious, challenges. The events covered in this publication range from safety factors, stakeholder motivation and involvement and leadership adequacies.
Decommissioning experts, including regulators, operators, waste managers, researchers and academics will find this book to be suitable supplementary material to Michele Laraia’s reference works on the theory and applications of nuclear decommissioning.
- Presents a selection of global case studies which focus on the people side of nuclear decommissioning, specifically public perception, stakeholder management and human factors
- Highlights important sustainability and socioeconomic factors
- Assists the reader in developing robust, people-related plans and strategies based on experience and lessons learned
Nuclear engineers; nuclear researchers; nuclear students; decommissioning specialists; governments and decision makers; nuclear operators and waste managers
- Cover image
- Title page
- Table of Contents
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Disclaimer
- Chapter 1. Introduction
- Chapter 2. Standardization and sustainability as applicable to nuclear decommissioning
- Chapter 3. The structure of this book: security, safety and environmental rules
- Chapter 4. Categorization of rules, legislation, regulations, standards, procedures, guidelines and others
- 4.1. Appendix to Chapter 4. A concrete example of applications of different tiers of standards to decommissioning-related equipment (HSE, 2008)
- Chapter 5. Higher-tier rules for decommissioning: concepts and supporting case studies
- 5.1. Impending regulatory issues with the decommissioning of US nuclear power plants (Lordan-Perret et al., 2021)
- 5.2. Communicating actions required by changes in law or regulation, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2010)
- 5.3. Safety standard requirements may not fully address hazard controls (DOE-LATA, 2013)
- 5.4. Radiological assistance program implementation, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2014)
- 5.5. Interpreting codes and standards (DOE-WTP, 2012)
- 5.6. Previously unknown requirements impact technical approach to removal actions at SLAC, Menlo Park, California, United States (DOE-PMLL, 2013)
- 5.7. Code of record documentation, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-WRPS, 2013)
- 5.8. Very low level waste: the US experience (NRC, 2021)
- 5.9. Clarity in technical documents is essential, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2007)
- 5.10. Procedures must provide sufficient details to support implementation, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2013)
- 5.11. When teaming across organizations obtain the correct understanding of words/phrases/acronyms (DOE- WTP, 2019)
- 5.12. Electrical code guidance for decontamination and decommissioning activities at DOE facilities (DOE-2012)
- 5.13. Ambiguity in emergency requirements causes over-conservative response, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-WRPS, 2014)
- 5.14. Impacts of policy changes, East Tennessee Technology Park, Tennessee, United States
- 5.15. Welding activities not covered by a code or a standard (DOE, 2017)
- 5.16. Authorized limits for release and clearance of personal property at DOE sites (DOE, 2021)
- 5.17. An unusual example of regulatory longevity (Phil Rutherford, 2021)
- 5.18. Proposed regulatory amendments to decommissioning-related financial requirements (DOT-IRS, 2020)
- 5.19. The demise of NRC's below-regulatory-concern policy (Jamerson et al., 2018)
- 5.20. The NRC is in the process of amending its regulations for decommissioning power reactors (Gregoire, 2017)
- 5.21. NRC may change reactor decommissioning financial security (Morgan Lewis, 2020)
- 5.22. Emergency planning for decommissioning nuclear power reactors (NRC, 2018)
- 5.23. Emergency planning exemptions
- 5.24. The contentious ‘rubblization’ approach, Maine Yankee NPP (EPRI, 2005)
- 5.25. The use of realistic dose scenarios in US regulations (IAEA, 2011)
- 5.26. The evolution of regulatory positions in regard to management of greater-than-class C and transuranic waste (NRC, 2020; Kirk, 2018)
- 5.27. Change of release limits during decommissioning implementation; two case studies from Niederaichbach NPP (KKN), Germany
- 5.28. Legislative and regulatory framework can be inadequate to the purposes of decommissioning (IAEA, 2005)
- 5.29. Adapting and applying the Swedish regulatory system for decommissioning to nuclear power reactors (Amft et al., 2019)
- 5.30. Environmental impact assessment – proposed changes to regulations for nuclear reactor decommissioning projects (UK Government, 2018a)
- 5.31. Nuclear decommissioning consultation on the regulation of nuclear sites in the final stages of decommissioning and clean-up (UK Government, 2018c)
- 5.32. Untimely release of decommissioned site
- 5.33. The fate of spent fuel and its influence on the decommissioning process: evolving regulations in the United States (WNN, 2011; NRC, 2014)
- Chapter 6. Lower-tier rules for decommissioning: concepts and supporting case studies
- 6.1. Operational Safety Requirements misinterpretations, Rocky Flats Plant, Jefferson County, Colorado, United States
- 6.2. Procedure compliance, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States
- 6.3. Requirements flow down in document date, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2002)
- 6.4. Control of externally prepared technical procedures, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2006a)
- 6.5. Procedure compliance is required as facility status changes (DOE-RL, 2006b)
- 6.6. Knowledgeable personnel is not tantamount to good procedures, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2006c)
- 6.7. Misinterpretation of authority causes rigging problem, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 2007)
- 6.8. Two case studies at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Kentucky, United States
- 6.9. A procedure was issued without establishing all elements needed for implementation (DOE-WTP, 2012)
- 6.10. Verification of project scope regarding procedural coverage, Portsmouth Site, Ohio, United States (DOE-FBPORTS, 2013)
- 6.11. Understanding correct entry criteria is paramount to procedure compliance type of work Hanford Site, Tank Farms/C-112, Washington State, United States (DOE-WRPS, 2014)
- 6.12. Near miss electrical arc incident, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), Kentucky, United States (DOE-PRS, 2010)
- 6.13. Potential for asbestos exposure during cooling tower demolition, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, United States (DOE-ANL, 2013)
- 6.14. Incorrect document revision discovered on the procedure Idaho treatment group, Idaho, United States (DOE-AMWTP, 2013)
- 6.15. Clearly define the use of ‘N/A’ relative to the need to follow the procedure, Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee, United States (DOE-UCORSM, 2013)
- 6.16. Work classification must be appropriate to mitigate hazards near overhead power date: Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RCCC, 2013)
- 6.17. Technical procedures process needs post evolution reviews, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-WRPS, 2012)
- 6.18. International standards for the development and diffusion of decommissioning technologies (Sinicrope et al., 2019)
- 6.19. Development of a Technical Standard for Radiological Characterization of DAW (Sydney Gordon and Dilday, 2019)
- 6.20. DOE inspection of the Hanford Site chronic beryllium disease prevention programme (DOE, 2010)
- 6.21. Fall injury accident, Savannah River Site, South Carolina, United States (Laraia, 2021 a, sec. 5.7)
- 6.22. Proper storage and maintenance of records, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, California, United States (Laraia, 2021b, sec. 7.18)
- 6.23. Workers not associated with job planning, Former Uranium Enrichment Facilities (FUEF), Portsmouth Site, Ohio, United States (Laraia, 2021c)
- 6.24. Sellafield Ltd case studies
- Chapter 7. Security rules during decommissioning: concepts and supporting case studies (WINS, 2020)
- 7.1. Security concerns and measures during different decommissioning stages
- 7.2. Engaging all nuclear security stakeholders in the decommissioning process
- 7.3. Integrating security during decommissioning
- 7.4. Truck Tarp Security Cable Incident, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. United States (DOE-Bechtel, 2010)
- 7.5. Unintentional firearm discharge during training – the investigation results, Hanford Site, Washington state, United States (DOE-OES, 2010)
- 7.6. Fort St. Vrain independent spent fuel storage installation-facility improvement project (DNDKM-IT, 2018)
- 7.7. Classified work communications, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, United States (DOE-ORNL, 2020)
- 7.8. Two case studies about management of classified information at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, United States (DOE-ORNL, 2021a)
- 7.9. Non-routine conditions can affect performance, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), California, United States (DOE-LLNL, 2020)
- 7.10. Access issues, Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee, United States: three case studies (DOE, 2019)
- 7.11. Security requirements versus traffic disruption (Press and Journal, 2017)
- 7.12. Audit of NRC's oversight of security at decommissioning reactors (Lexology, 2017; NRC, 2017)
- 7.13. Vermont Yankee outsources security services, Vermont, United States
- 7.14. Falsified Engineering Change Notice, Hanford Site, Washington State, United States (DOE-RL, 1997)
- 7.15. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's experience with security challenges during decommissioning (NRC, 2015a)
- 7.16. NRC's interim staff guidance review of security exemptions requests for decommissioning NPPs (NRC, 2015b)
- 7.17. Proposed changes to security regulations for decommissioning NPPs (NRC, 2018)
- 7.18. Decommissioning progresses fast at Oyster Creek NPP, New Jersey, United States (WNN, 2021; The Sandpaper, 2021)
- 7.19. Security issues at Pilgrim NPP, Plymouth, Massachusetts, United States (WNN, 2021)
- 7.20. WVDP and Sheriff's office for security training, New York State, United States (DOE-EM, 2021b)
- 7.21. Security experience from decommissioning German NPPs (ICEM, 2013; NEI, 2014)
- 7.22. Sellafield security issues
- 7.23. Openness versus security in record keeping: the Nucleus case (NEI, 2021)
- 7.24. UK's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Information Security Manager (NDA, 2020)
- 7.25. Anti-nuclear activists as a security threat
- 7.26. Physical protection considerations for decommissioning a Korean NPP (Jounghoon Lee, 2018)
- 7.27. Physical protection of nuclear materials: early experience during Chernobyl NPP decommissioning (Pinchuk, 2001)
- Chapter 8. Conclusions
- 8.1. Savannah River Site
- 8.2. Moab Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project
- 8.3. Oak Ridge
- Abbreviations, acronyms, initialisms
- Glossary
- Index
- Edition: 1
- Volume: 4
- Published: April 16, 2022
- No. of pages (Paperback): 374
- No. of pages (eBook): 374
- Imprint: Academic Press
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN: 9780323918473
- eBook ISBN: 9780323915199
ML
Michele Laraia
Michele Laraia, a chemical engineer by background, gained his first degree at the University of Rome. In 1975 he began to work at Italy's Regulatory Body, since 1982 as licensing manager of decommissioning projects. From July 1991, Michele worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Waste Technology Section, as Unit Leader responsible for decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear installations and environmental remediation. The objectives of the work were to provide guidance to Member States on the planning and implementation of nuclear decommissioning and site remediation, to disseminate information on good practices, and to provide direct assistance to Member States in the implementation of their programmes. Following his retirement in November 2011 Michele offers consultant services in the above-mentioned areas.
Affiliations and expertise
Independent Consultant, Rome, ItalyRead Nuclear Decommissioning Case Studies on ScienceDirect