Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance
Empirical Corporate Finance
- 1st Edition, Volume 2 - September 11, 2014
- Latest edition
- Editor: Bjørn Espen Eckbo
- Language: English
- Hardback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 3 0 9 0 - 5
- Paperback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 4 4 4 - 5 6 1 7 9 - 4
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 0 8 - 0 9 3 2 1 1 - 8
This second volume of a two-part series examines three major topics. First, it devotes five chapters to the classical issue of capital structure choice. Second, it focuses on th… Read more
This second volume of a two-part series examines three major topics. First, it devotes five chapters to the classical issue of capital structure choice. Second, it focuses on the value-implications of major corporate investment and restructuring decisions, and then concludes by surveying the role of pay-for-performance type executive compensation contracts on managerial incentives and risk-taking behavior.
In collaboration with the first volume, this handbook takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues. The surveys are written by leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of interest. With few exceptions, the writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners. For doctoral students and seasoned academics, the surveys offer dense roadmaps into the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work.
- Nine original chapters summarize research advances and future topics in the classical issues of capital structure choice, corporate investment behavior, and firm value
- Multinational comparisons underline the volume's empirical perspectives
- Complements the presentation of econometric issues, banking, and capital acquisition research covered by Volume 1
University, research, and major public libraries with finance and economics holdings, academics in finance and economics
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
CONTENTS OF THE HANDBOOK
PREFACE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE
VOLUME 2
PART 3: DIVIDENDS, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Chapter 10: PAYOUT POLICY
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. The Miller and Modigliani irrelevance propositions
3. Dividends and taxes
4. Agency relationships and dividend policy
5. Asymmetric information and payout policy
6. Share repurchases
7. Alternative theories and new stylized facts
8. Conclusion
Chapter 11: TAXES AND CORPORATE FINANCE
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Taxes and capital structure—the U.S. tax system
3. Taxes and capital structure—international tax issues
4. Taxes, LBOs, corporate restructuring, and organizational form
5. Taxes and payout policy
6. Taxes and compensation policy
7. Taxes, corporate risk management, and earnings management
8. Tax shelters
9. Summary and suggestions for future research
Chapter 12: TRADE-OFF AND PECKING ORDER THEORIES OF DEBT
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Theory
3. Evidence
4. Conclusion
5. Appendix: the stylized facts
Chapter 13: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Abstract
Chapter 14: BANKRUPTCY AND THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework
3. Asset restructuring
4. Debt workouts
5. Governance of distressed firms
6. Bankruptcy costs
7. The success of chapter 11 reorganization
8. International evidence
9. Conclusion
PART 4: TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURINGS, AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
Chapter 15: CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Takeover activity
3. Bidding strategies
4. Takeover gains
5. Bondholders, executives, and arbitrageurs
6. Takeovers, competition and antitrust
7. Summary and conclusions
Chapter 16: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: BREAKUPS AND LBOs
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Restructurings and the boundaries of the firm
3. Divestitures
4. Spinoffs
5. Equity carveouts
6. Tracking stocks
7. Leveraged recapitalizations
8. Leveraged buyouts (LBO)
9. Conclusions
Chapter 17: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Trends in executive compensation
3. Incentives and agency
4. Relative performance evaluation
5. Do incentives influence firm performance?
6. Alternatives to the agency view
7. Conclusion
Chapter 18: MANAGING CORPORATE RISK
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Risk exposures and hedging
3. Benefits of risk management
4. The costs of risk management
5. Evidence on corporate hedging
6. Conclusion
AUTHOR INDEX
SUBJECT INDEX
- Edition: 1
- Latest edition
- Volume: 2
- Published: September 11, 2014
- Language: English
BE
Bjørn Espen Eckbo
Professor B. Espen Eckbo holds the Tuck Centennial Chair in Finance. He is also Faculty Director of Tuck's Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance, which he founded in 1999. He teaches advanced MBA courses in the areas of corporate finance, corporate takeovers and international corporate governance. Professor Eckbo, who received a PhD in financial economics from the University of Rochester in 1981, has published extensively in the top finance journals in the areas of corporate finance, investment banking, and the market for corporate control. He is a recipient of an honorary doctoral degree from the Norwegian School of Economics, the prestigious Batterymarch Fellowship, as well as several outstanding-paper awards. He is a research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and a frequent keynote and invited seminar speaker. He was called in 2009 by the U.S. Congress to testify on issues concerning the government’s large equity ownership positions in companies rescued under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Affiliations and expertise
Center for Corporate Governance, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA