Designing for Human Reliability
Human Factors Engineering in the Oil, Gas, and Process Industries
- 1st Edition - March 19, 2015
- Imprint: Gulf Professional Publishing
- Author: Ronald W. McLeod
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 0 2 4 2 1 - 8
- eBook ISBN:9 7 8 - 0 - 0 8 - 1 0 0 5 2 6 - 2
Industry underestimates the extent to which behaviour at work is influenced by the design of the working environment. Designing for Human Reliability argues that greater awareness… Read more
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Request a sales quoteIndustry underestimates the extent to which behaviour at work is influenced by the design of the working environment. Designing for Human Reliability argues that greater awareness of the contribution of design to human error can significantly enhance HSE performance and improve return on investment. Illustrated with many examples, Designing for Human Reliability explores why work systems are designed and implemented such that "design-induced human error" becomes more-or-less inevitable. McLeod demonstrates how well understood psychological processes can lead people to make decisions and to take actions that otherwise seem impossible to understand. Designing for Human Reliability sets out thirteen key elements to deliver the levels of human reliability expected to achieve the return on investment sought when decisions are made to invest in projects. And it demonstrates how investigation of the human contribution to incidents can be improved by focusing on what companies expected and intended when they chose to rely on human performance as a barrier, or control, against incidents.
- Recognise some ‘hard truths’ of human performance and learn about the importance of applying the principles of Human Factors Engineering on capital projects
- Learn from analysis of real-world incidents how differences between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ styles of thinking can lead to human error in industrial processes
- Learn how controls and barrier against major incidents that rely on human performance can be strengthened throughout the design and development of assets and equipment
Oil and Gas Executives; Managers; and Technical Safety, Health and Safety professionals, Process Safety Professionals/Engineers, and Human Factors Engineers
Part 1: Local rationality at the Formosa Plastics Corporation
Introduction
- The principle of Local Rationality
2: The incident
- Abstract
- The operator arrived at the wrong reactor
- The local control panel
- What did they expect?
- Commitment and capture
- Overriding the safety interlock
3: Making sense of Formosa
- Abstract
- Why did he conclude that the switch was faulty?
- Why did he decide to override the safety interlock?
- Was he aware of the risk?
- It was easy to do
- It was difficult to get the necessary approval
- Summary
Part 2: The scope and value of human factors engineering
Introduction
4: An introduction to HFE
- Abstract
- The HFE star
- A dual fatality offshore
- The objectives of HFE
- Achieving the HFE objectives
- Summary
5: Costs and benefits of human factors engineering
- Abstract
- The costs of design-induced human unreliability
- Perspectives on the costs and benefits of HFE
- An example: Before and after HFE
- How much does it cost to implement an HFE program?
- Summary
6: Hard truths and principles of human factors engineering
- Abstract
- The principles of HFE
- Hard truths of human performance
- Summary
7: Critical tasks
- Abstract
- The nature of “tasks”
- Summary
8: HFE and weak signals
- Abstract
- The characteristics of weak signals
- Weak signals and Situation Awareness
- The Theory of Signal Detection (TSD)
- Weak signals and human factors engineering
- Summary
9: Automation and supervisory control
- Abstract
- Supervisory control
- The irony of automation
- Air France Flight AF447
- Lessons and challenges from AF447
- Summary
Part 3: Irrational people in a rational industry
Introduction
10: The problem with people
- Abstract
- The problem with people
- Deepwater horizon
11: Kahneman
- Abstract
- System 1 and System 2 thinking
- Reconciling Kahneman and Reason
12: Operationalizing some System 1 biases
- Abstract
- Availability and affect
- Anchoring
- Priming
- What you see is all there is (WYSIATI)
- Framing and loss aversion: prospect theory
13: Expert intuition and experience
- Abstract
- The experiencing and the remembering self
- Expert intuition
14: Summary of Part 3
- Abstract
Part 4: Human Factors in Barrier Thinking
Introduction
15: What did you expect?
- Abstract
- Human factors in incident investigations
- So what did they expect?
16: Human factors in barrier thinking
- Abstract
- Bow-ties as a conceptual model
- Bow-tie analysis
- An example bow-tie analysis
- Assuring the strength of human controls
- Human factors in control independence
- The representation of bow-ties
- Summary
17: Intentions, expectations, and reality
- Abstract
- The effectiveness of controls
- What can a bow-tie analysis reveal of intentions and expectations about human performance?
- Expectations, intentions, and reality: Lessons from Buncefield
- Summary
18: Proactive operator monitoring
- Abstract
- What does operator monitoring really mean?
- Job design
- Work arrangements
- What information does the operator need to be able to monitor?
- Control room design
- The use of human factors standards in the design of control rooms and human-computer interfaces
- Balancing operator preference and technical standards
- Proactive monitoring
- Summary
19: Assuring human barriers
- Abstract
- Assurance and auditing
- Human variability
- ALARP or AHARP?
- Human factors engineering in the assurance of controls
- Human reliability analysis
- How would an experienced professional assure human controls?
- Summary
20: Reflections on Buncefield
- Abstract
- Local rationality at Buncefield
- Implications for Human Factors Engineering
Part 5: Implementing HFE
Introduction
21: Implementing HFE in Projects
- Abstract
- What goes wrong?
- What needs to go right?
- Some questions for investors
- Summary
22: Human factors and learning from incidents
- Abstract
- Purpose of the chapter
- All incidents are, in principle, avoidable
- A perspective on learning about the human contribution to incidents: four key questions
- Establishing the situation
- Q1: What controls did the organization expect would have prevented the incident?
- Q2: How did those controls actually perform?
- Q3: Why did the expected controls not prevent the incident?
- Q4: How can the controls be strengthened to protect against future incidents?
- Summary
23: In conclusion
- Abstract
- Reflections on local rationality
- Some research and development topics
- Edition: 1
- Published: March 19, 2015
- No. of pages (Paperback): 422
- No. of pages (eBook): 422
- Imprint: Gulf Professional Publishing
- Language: English
- Paperback ISBN: 9780128024218
- eBook ISBN: 9780081005262
RM
Ronald W. McLeod
Ronald W. McLeod, Ph.D., is a human factor specialist who combines strong academic credentials with more than 30 years industrial experience in Human Factors and Applied Psychology. He founded Nickleby HFE Ltd, in 1990 and was both Managing Director and Technical Director until 2007. His team provided services in applied research and system design across industries including defence, oil and gas, nuclear power, aerospace, and financial services. In 2007, he joined Shell as Global Discipline Lead for Human Factors and continued to work there until February 2014. At Shell, Ron led a global team of Human Factors specialists and was responsible for Shell's Design Engineering Practices on Human Factors Engineering, as well as assurance of technical competence of both Shell and contractors staff. He was also one of Shell's lead Subject Matter Experts on Fatigue Risk Management. He left Shell in February 2014 to pursue interests in writing and now works part-time as an independent consultant. Ron earned a B.Sc degree with Honors in Psychology from the University of Stirling, an M.Sc in Ergonomics from Loughborough University of Technology, and Ph.D. in Engineering and Applied Science from the University of Southampton. He is Honorary Professor of Engineering Psychology at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh, Scotland. Ron is a registered member of the Institute of Human Factors and Ergonomics, and is a member of the Human Factors Society and the Society of Petroleum Engineers. He has contributed to numerous industry best practices and guides produced by organizations including IOGP/IPIECA, SPE and the Energy Institute. Ron was an invited member of the Psychology User Panel for the UK's 2003 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE 2003) and was a member of UK National Advisory Committee on Human Factors from 2001-2006. He was Shell's representative on Human Factors sub-committee of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers from 2008-2013, a member of Buncefield Industry Working Group #7 (Human Factors) and a member of Working Group 1 of the UK Process Safety Leadership Group.
Affiliations and expertise
Independent Human Factors Consultant, UKRead Designing for Human Reliability on ScienceDirect