Corruption

AcknowledgmentsIntroduction 1 Corruption as a Problem in Political Economy 1. Corruption and the Mixed Economy 2. Agency Relationships and Functional Bribery 3. An Overview of the ArgumentLegislative Corruption 2 Corruption and the Legislative Process: The Cost of Influence in an Individualistic Legislature 1. Introduction 2. Corruption in a Perfect Democratic State 3. Politicians with Imperfect Information 4. The Structure of Interest Group Organization 5. Conclusions Appendix 2.1. An Example that Generates the Utility Surfaces in Figure 2.1 Appendix 2.2. Competitive Bribery in an Individualistic Legislature 3 Interest Group Activity and the Legislature: Corruption, Campaign Contributions, and Lobbying 1. Introduction 2. Ignorance, Apathy, and the Role of Wealth 3. Monopoly Power and Legislative Corruption 4. Interest Group Resources and Organization 5. Conclusions 4 Bureaucratic Corruption and the Legislative Process 1. Introduction 2. Low-Level Corruption 3. High-Level Corruption 4. Trading Favors for Votes 5. Political Systems without a Separation of Powers 6. Conclusions: The Public Policy Consequences of Corruption and Political Payoffs AppendixBureaucratic Corruption 5 Lining Up and Paying Off 1. Low-Level Corruption: An Overview 2. The Efficiency of Bribery 3. Single Lines and Priority Queues 4. Corruption and the Risk of Detection 5. Conclusions Appendix 6 Monopolistic Bureaucracy 1. Introduction 2. A Summary of the Results 3. Formal Models 4. Policy Implications 7 Competitive Bureaucracy: Corruption i regulatory and Social Programs 1. Introduction 2. The Basic Model 3. Supply and Demand Functions 4. The Corrupt Market 5. Conclusions Appendix 8 Competitive Bureaucracy: Vagueness, Coersion and Market Structure 1. Introduction 2. Choosing Those Who Qualify 3. Coercive Programs 4. Customers with Monopoly Power 5. Conclusions 9 Bureaucratic Structure and Corruption 1. Introduction: Four Models of Bureaucracy 2. The Fragmented and Sequential Models 3. The Hierarchical Model 4. Choosing the Least Corrupt Form of Bureaucracy 5. Disorganized Bureaucracies 6. Conclusions 10 Corruption and the Private Sector 1. Introduction 2. Private Firm Organization and Corruption 3. The Corruption of Corporate Boards and Top Managers 4. Market Failure as a Cause of Corruption 5. Conclusions: Corrupt Incentives in the Public and Private SectorsConclusion 11 Conclusions: Economics, Politics, and Morality 1. Corruption and Democratic Theory 2. Low-Level Corruption 3. Morality, Corruption, and Economic TheoryBibliographyAuthor IndexSubject Index